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A. Introduction 
This paper will discuss the structure of corporate ownership and control in the United 
States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany. Although both countries experienced 
similar historical trends towards greater institutional ownership, their subsequent treatment 
of the consequences of this evolution is substantially different. Taken as a whole, this 
comparison can allow more thorough and exhaustive analysis of the corporate governance 
concerns that plague both systems. We hope to meet the challenge of expounding upon the 
parallels and variances between the two nations in order to create an ongoing dialogue 
regarding these tenuous issues facing capital markets and public corporations.  
B. U.S. Section 
 The Evolved Ownership and Control Paradigm 
 
I. Introduction  
 
 The separation of ownership and control has long been a source of tension in U.S. 
corporate governance. The tension naturally arises in publicly traded corporations where the 
shareholders are unable to directly govern and instead must elect boards to exercise control on 
their behalf. As with any agency relationship, conflicts and divergence of interest arise and in 
an effort to diminish the associated agency costs, a number of mechanisms have been tested 
and implemented: the application of fiduciary duties, management financial incentive 
structures, and a variety of regulatory schemes. Despite the necessary tensions intrinsic in this 
relationship, there are substantial benefits to this separation as well, namely creating a more 
efficient capital market system in which investors are able to use their time to invest rather 
than govern, but more significantly, allowing corporations to be more than pure profit 
maximizers and simultaneously prioritize stakeholder interests and corporate social 
responsibility. As the structure of share ownership has evolved, so too did the original 
ownership and control paradigm, and now the worry is if the indispensable separation 
between ownership and control has diminished too greatly. While the original moral hazard 
problems still exist, there are now additional costs that have arisen as a consequence of these 
new shifts in the traditional model.  
This section of the paper will primarily attempt to answer these central questions 
regarding U.S. corporate structure: 1) given the current relationship between investors and the 
governing board, what have been the most fundamental consequences of this change, 2) if this 
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effectively has narrowed the separation of control and ownership, what are then the 
implications of this transformation, and 3) looking forward, is the current path a sustainable 
one for the future of corporate governance and corporate value? By acting as the internal 
governing vehicle on behalf of shareholders, the board’s primary responsibility is to monitor 
management. However, the board’s duty is to the corporate entity, not to its shareholders. 
Thus, when the board’s interests becomes either overly divergent from shareholders’, or when 
they simply acquiesce to them, the board’s governance becomes grossly insufficient. Policies 
that actively encourage greater shareholder control may in fact undermine the traditional 
reasons behind the separation of control from ownership.  
Since the end of World War II, the original Berle and Means corporate ownership 
structure in the United States has evolved from a diffuse, predominantly retail shareholder 
base to a composition of more concentrated, institutional holders. This gradual shift, while 
intriguing in itself, has had great implications for governance and the relationship between 
ownership and control. The consequences of these broad changes in corporate control cannot 
be fully explained by a move away from dispersed ownership, however. As shareholders have 
been given greater deference and more governance tools to further their ability to seek and 
maintain a voice in corporate discussions, these changes have allowed shareholders ever 
greater access to control and activism. 
The original Berle and Means agency problem stemmed from the disconnect that 
existed between a board effectively controlled by management and the dispersed, individual 
investors. Shareholders, once powerless, now have an advent of options to affect control, and 
this expanded influence of institutional holders has both transformed the original agency 
problem and created new agency tensions: 1) board myopia and the subsequent acquiescence 
towards shareholders, 2) the dichotomous relationship between the beneficiary owners of 
shares and their intermediary holders and 3) minority, activist hedge funds acting as 
controlling shareholders. The limited commitment problem, which depends on the prevailing 
belief that most institutional holders are rationally short-term, drives each of these agency 
problems. Due to information asymmetry and inefficiency, strong exit rights, and generally 
shorter investment holding periods, it is argued that shareholders are less likely to know when 
a long-term investment will pay off and thus will remain less committed to long-term business 
strategies proposed by the board, especially if presented with profitable alternatives such as a 
push for dividend distribution, the sale of shares through hostile takeovers, or the removal and 
election of directors by proxy.  
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While the Berle and Means scenario focused on the dangers of misalignment, today’s 
corporate ownership and control concern should be on board acquiescence. Boards, in an 
effort to appease powerful instituitional investors and keep their positions, may agree to more 
short-term value creation, so in addition to concerns regarding moral hazard, board myopia 
now also plagues the relationship between shareholders and directors. Given the incentives 
structure of these institutions, in which they mainly earn profit through diversification and 
success of their portfolios, rather than through a focused interest on any particular 
corporation, institutional shareholders are arguably less likely to value governance rights. 
Their supposedly more short-term approach to ownership and governance differs from the 
longer-term concerns of the actual beneficial owners of these shares. This tension from the 
limited commitment problem is at the root of the more complex agency problem of activist 
hedge funds acting as controlling shareholders. Hedge funds often do not own a controlling 
bloc of shares but have been able to act as majority shareholders. This ability to exercise 
control, of course, is dependent on other institutional investors’ cooperation, and when they 
do “collude” together, whether purposefully or not, they tend to have specific, targeted 
agendas. The limited commitment problem is truly exacerbated here; academic literature 
repeatedly articulates that hedge fund activists have strong incentive to convince other 
investors to abandon their longer-term strategies, even if at the eventual detriment to the 
corporation, other stakeholders, and even shareholders themselves. Under US corporate law, 
minority holders like activists would not owe any fiduciary duties to other shareholders. 
However, it is foreseeable that the interests of shareholders, controlling or not, are likely to be 
in conflict. That activists have the ability to effectuate control without the corresponding 
ownership and necessary capital risk is intriguing and it is worth further examination whether 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty should be levied on them. 
The shift to more concentrated institutional ownership has created several new 
corporate governance questions, but the overall theme of this trend is that dominant 
shareholders are both more incentivized and now possess the ability to influence their fellow 
shareholders and consequently, able to discipline management, which might work in direct 
opposition to the longer-term values and interests of minority holders, beneficiary owners, 
and the general corporate entity. How did institutional holders come to possess an increased 
ability to influence boards and management? Are the interests of activist and minority holders 
necessarily different, and if so, why? Or even those of beneficiary owners and the 
intermediary institutions? These questions can only be answered by initially understanding the 
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incentive structures that motivate institutional owners. The once problematic implications of 
separation of ownership and control no longer exist in the same form, only to be replaced by 
more complex corporate governance issues. 
 
II. The Shift Away from the Berle and Means Corporation 
 
When Berle and Means originally published Modern Corporation and Private Property 
in 1932, their description of America’s dispersed shareholder ownership and the consequent 
separation of ownership and control was an accurate depiction of the U.S. corporate world.1 
Shareholders were mainly retail investors who had little incentive to become intricately 
involved in the governance process of any particular corporation. For any investor, 
diversification is integral and being able to reduce firm specific risk allows otherwise risk-
averse shareholders to invest their capital with potentially risk-loving management. While this 
scheme allows the capital market system to function efficiently, this also necessarily means 
investors have multiple points of interest and likely conflicted interests. Retail investors of the 
Berle-Means era could not feasibly monitor corporate boards and insiders,2 nor would they 
likely have desired to. And  because of how widely spread out these investors were, there was 
the justified concern that they were weak and passive, essentially powerless before the whims 
of the board and management.3 Understandably, the authors emphasized a more paternalistic 
approach towards corporate actors and believed there was a need for regulatory measures to 
serve both as a protection mechanism for shareholders and a control mechanism to prevent 
management from engaging in potentially harmful and risky behavior both to investors and to 
society.4 Boards who actively and effectively monitor management would have ideally 
reduced agency costs that occur as a basic consequence of this separation of ownership and 
control. The question on how best to diminish the agency costs associated with the separation 
of ownership and control is one that still very much exists and continues to trouble regulators 
and corporate governance experts alike.  
In the past fifty years, the fundamental nature of ownership has changed. Retail 
owners are now in the minority of American holders and institutional owners have gained a 
                                                            
1 ADOLF BERLE AND GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, TRANSACTION 
PUBLISHERS (1932) [hereinafter “Berle”].  
2 Id.  
3 Id.  
4 Mark S. Mizruchi, Berle and Means revisited: the governance and power of large U.S. corporations, 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, 2 (Apr. 2004).  
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significantly greater stake in the equity holdings of America’s corporations.5 During this same 
time period, both the SEC and corporate actors themselves have acquiesced in giving 
shareholders more authority.6 Proxy voting, “Say on Pay” provisions, the election of outsider 
directors are all indicators of increased shareholder authority and equally importantly, they are 
vehicles by which shareholders can gain more power and control. While many institutional 
holders are reluctant to exercise an active role in the direction and governance of corporations, 
corporate governance literature suggest many institutional investors tend to agree with other 
institutional investors on questions of governance and control.7 Thus, even if one institutional 
shareholder does not account for a substantial segment of a corporation’s investor base, an 
aggressive shareholder can make a noticeable difference if it has the support of the other 
institutional holders.  
 
III. Who Owns American Corporations Today? 
 
In today’s capital markets, over 70% of the top 500 U.S. corporations are held by 
institutional investors.8 Retail ownership has declined substantially but still make up almost a 
substantial investor base in the U.S. capital markets. Government ownership of public 
corporations in the U.S. has been significantly less common throughout the 20th century 
compared to other developed nations and was “virtually non-existent in recent U.S. 
experience until the 2008 financial crisis.”9  Despite having wholly-government owned 
corporations in the U.S.10, “mixed enterprises”, with both private and government ownership, 
are generally viewed skeptically and suspiciously by the American people. The government 
bailout of banks and corporations post-recession was subject to significant criticism and 
corporate actors were eager to have the state sell their ownership stakes. Although there is 
plenty to say in regards to retail and government ownership of public corporations, for 
                                                            
5 THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION 
AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION, Table 10 (2010) [hereinafter “Conference Board”]. 
6 Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. 
Corp. L. 681, 686-89 (2007) (discussing the amendments to the SEC proxy regulations in 1992 that greatly 
expanded the ability of shareholders to influence change in corporations); see also Robert C. Pozen, Institutional 
Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (Jan.-Feb. 1994). 
7 GILE R. DOWNES ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR, AEI, 3, 4, 9 (1999) (positing 
that all institutional investors agree on furthering shareholder rights, voting against bad governance (regardless 
of performance), poison pills, share repricing) [Hereinafter “Downes”].  
8 Conference Board, supra note 5.  
9 Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, FORDHAM LAW REV., Vol 80, Iss. 6 2925 
(2012) (noting that even if the U.S. government has employed the corporate form, they did it through sole-
proprietorships or as guarantors, rather than shareholders of private capital) [hereinafter “Pargendler”]. 
10 To name a few: Amtrak, Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Conrail, North Dakota Mill and Elevator.  
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purposes of this paper, it is more relevant to look at the rise of institutional ownership and its 
subsequent influence on the control paradigm.  
Gilson and Gordon describe three types of institutional shareholders: mutual funds, 
pension funds, and hedge funds.11 Mutual funds are investment companies that are subject to 
strict regulatory oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“the SEC”).12 One of 
these rules requires that holders of securities in mutual funds must be able to withdraw their 
funds at any time, which consequently mandates these funds develop a more short-term 
investment strategy that permits immediate liquidity.13 Record owners for any mutual fund are 
only subject to very low minimal investments, and because of these lower minimum 
requirements, the holders in a mutual fund are typically less sophisticated, less wealthy 
“laymen” investors who use these investments for longer-term gains. In selecting their 
portfolio managers, investors follow the relative performance of these funds, by comparing 
the performance of all funds market wide.14 This type of selection process has direct 
consequences on investment strategy. The success of a mutual fund portfolio ultimately 
depends almost entirely on having an advantage over the market, meaning that fund managers 
ultimately value private gains over shared market gains.  
Pension funds share many of the same features as mutual funds, with the main 
difference being that the beneficiaries, the employees of the organization, are obliged to join 
in the fund.15 It is important to point out that trustees and managers of pension funds have 
occasionally engaged in politicization of their funds, sometimes ethically, sometimes not.16 In 
2015, the Obama Administration’s Labor Department issued Interpretative Bulletin 2015-01 
declaring that “[e]nvironmental, social and governance issues may have a direct relationship 
to the economic value of the plan’s investment” and explicitly allows pension fund managers 
to consider other factors beyond pure profit maximization.17 Although this rule now gives 
                                                            
11 Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and The 
Revaluation of Governance Rights, COL. LAW REV. Vol 113:863 (2013) [hereinafter “Gilson”]. 
12 Arthur H. Kohn and Julie L. Yip-Williams, The Separation of Ownership from Ownership: Concerns Arising 
from Institutional Investors as Intermediaries, THE CONFERENCE BOARD (Nov. 2013) [hereinafter “Kohn”].    
13 Invest Wisely: An Introduction to Mutual Funds, SEC, available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm (last visited February 22, 2016). It should be noted that despite 
immediate redepemtion rights, a signifcant portion of the funding is not touched for years at a time and many 
funds have very low turn-over rates.  
14 Gilson, supra note 11, at 894.  
15 Kohn, supra note 12.  
16 A less than ethical instance involved the President of CalPers, who also served as the Executive Director of 
Safeway’s Union, who used CalPer’s position as a major shareholder of Safeway to try and intervene in the 
Union’s dispute with the company. He was later removed from the board of CalPers.  
17 Department of Labor, Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in Considering 
Economically Targeted Investments (Oct. 2015).  
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more leeway to pension fund managers to substitute in less quantifiable variables for their 
investment strategies, they generally have had similar investment strategies to mutual funds 
since these portfolio managers are also selected based on the superior relative returns they can 
create. No fund manager is incentivized to chase after gains that do not reflect their 
competitive advantage of the market. Because of their similar investment strategies, Gilson 
argues that pension and mutual funds alike are less likely to strongly value governing rights.18 
A poorly managed corporation might demand some level of shareholder involvement, but 
successfully intervening would create value for all shareholders to enjoy, which is directly 
contrary to these funds’ investment strategies. The success of mutual and pension funds’ 
portfolios are dependent on private gains, rather than collective benefits. Furthermore, fund 
managers will engage in the practice of “underweighting” some of their shares—allowing the 
fund manager to benefit in relative terms if the price of the stock declines in the market—but 
ultimately incentivizing them from improving the corporation’s performance.19 Given both 
the compensation structure of these institutions, the hypothesis is that these institutional 
investors have little incentive to participate in governance decisions.20 Consequently, the 
portfolio managers are arguably less motivated to engage in governance interventions to 
optimize the management and value of any particular corporation. And while undervaluing 
governance rights may be in the best interest of the fund managers and funds themselves, this 
serves to create a new agency problem between the institutional holders and the beneficial 
owners of the shares, dubbed “agency capitalism” by Gilson and Gordon and explored at 
length later on in this paper.21  
Hedge funds are structured in a substantively different way from these other funds. 
Primarily because they are not required to register with the SEC, hedge funds are not subject 
to many of the same strict regulations that govern these other institutional holders.22 Their 
securities are issued in “private offerings” to highly sophisticated investors who meet a high 
wealth minimum. Most importantly, their investments are not subject to immediate 
redemption and liquidity requirements.23 Shareholders typically cannot demand to redeem 
their shares at any time, and this gives hedge funds the flexibility to implement longer-term 
                                                            
18 Edward Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, Univ. of Penn. Law School, Paper 1458, 13-
14 (2015).  
19 Simon C.Y. Wong, How conflicts of interest thwart institutional investor stewardship, BUTTERWORTHS 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCIAL LAW (Sept. 2011).  
20 Id.; see also Gilson, supra note 11.   
21 Gilson, supra note 11.   
22 Kohn, supra note 12.  
23 Id. 
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investment strategies should they choose. Because of the higher wealth and investment 
requirement and the longer-hold period, the return on these securities are generally 
significantly higher. Hedge funds are able to hold more concentrated positions in a fewer 
number of corporations, and analysis of activist hedge fund portfolio turnover rates suggests 
longer holding periods of around 20 months.24  Given all of these differentiating factors, 
hedge funds have significantly different investment strategies and a small segment of them 
have become activist investors25: they acquire a non-controlling but significant stake in a 
given corporation in an attempt to improve the corporation’s governance and business 
practices, whether through private discussions with the board or more aggressive tactics.26 In 
contrast to other institutional holders, activist hedge funds tend to place a higher value on 
governance rights and choose to monitor boards to extract private gains from successful 
interventions.27 The true value creation of activism is debated amongst legal scholars, 
practitioners, and jurists across the country28—whether hedge funds, with the help and 
acquiescence of other institutional shareholders, actually contribute any genuine value to the 
corporate entity or to minority shareholders is not easily measured and too substantial a topic 
to discuss justly here. Putting aside any additional value judgments tied to activism, the 
corporate control and governance questions that the activist evolution has generated are 
certainly pertinent to this discussion and should be addressed.  
One key requirement for the activist’s success is the cooperation of the other 
institutional shareholders. These are no longer the dispersed and powerless investors of 
yester-year and even while some institutional investors are purportedly less interested in 
governance rights, they still value short-term profitability and shareholder rights, which 
activists tend to emphasize.29 Having the support of institutional holders during proxy contests 
or activist interventions is extremely advantageous, and this support is probably the most 
significant factor in any hedge fund’s success. The prevalent use of shareholder advisory 
                                                            
24 Brav et al., The Return to Hedge Fund Activism, EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE (Mar 2008).  
25 It should be clarified that not all activists are hedge funds and certainly not all hedge funds are activists, but 
the most prominent and active activists are hedge funds.  
26 Shane Goodwin, Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL (Sept. 2015) 
(arguing that the compensation structure and the deregulation of hedge funds makes them better monitors of 
management than other institutional investors).  
27 Id.  
28 The infamous disagreement between Lucian Bebchuk and Marty Lipton over activism has been considerably 
discussed and analyzed by corporate law academics, jurists, and practitioners, but there is no objective standard 
on who is correct as to the long-term value creation of activism.  
29 Downes, supra note 7.  
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services can also be considered a contributing factor in this institutional “collusion.” 30 In 
Nelson Peltz’s recent campaign over DuPont, the proxy advisory firms were clearly biased 
towards the activist and recommended the company’s largest institutional holders to vote for 
Peltz’s recommended board members.31 While the shareholders ignored the proxy 
recommendations and sided with the DuPont board, it is significant to note that proxy 
advisory firms tend to favor activism. The concern would be then that institutional 
shareholders who use proxy advisory services are passive voters and merely follow the proxy 
recommendations, even if their voting recommendations are clearly biased. In a recent study 
on institutional investors, it was reported that the average portfolio manager who manages 
$100 billion or more in assets, only make approximately 10% of all voting decisions.32 
Outsourcing research and voting decisions arguably can induce boards to make decisions that 
acquiesce to policies favored by proxy advisory firms, but may in fact decrease shareholder 
value.33  However, according to other academic research, while a substantial subset of 
institutional investors may use proxy advisory firms, they do not substitute the proxy’s 
recommendations for their own voice.34 The influence of proxy advisory firms is not 
insignificant,35 but perhaps its influence on governance questions has been overstated by the 
media.  
 
IV. U.S. treatment of shareholders and the subsequent effect on the corporation  
a) Fiduciary Duties owed to and by shareholders  
 
In the U.S., the courts give significant guidance on the fiduciary duties directors owe 
to corporations to maximize value.36 Although traditionally expressed as duties to the 
corporation, the only group allowed to bring derivative suits against directors and 
                                                            
30 Nadya Malenko and Yao Shen, The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity 
Design, Boston College (2015) (emphasizing the role of proxy advisory firms in influencing voting outcomes is 
‘substantial and should not be understated) [hereinafter “Malenko”]. 
31 David Benoit, Proxy Adviser Backs Two Trian Board Seats at DuPont, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Apr. 27, 
2015) http://www.wsj.com/articles/iss-backs-activist-trian-getting-two-board-seats-at-dupont-1430145193. 
32 SEC, 2015 INVESTOR SURVEY DECONSTRUCTING PROXY STATEMENTS-WHAT MATTERS TO INVESTORS (2015).  
33 Larcker et al., Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, Stanford Journal of Law and 
Economics (Oct. 30, 2014). 
34 Joseph A. McCahery, et al. Behind the Scenes: the Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional 
Investors, Journal of Finance (June 2015) (arguing that investors who use proxy advisory firms make their own 
decisions and only use proxy recommendations to gather further guidance on the issues).  
35 Malenko, supra note 25.  
36 These include the duty of loyalty, duty of care, and the less explicit but equally important duties of good faith 
and fair dealing.  
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management for breaches of their duties are shareholders.37 The same fiduciary duties that are 
owed to shareholders by the board are not owed equivocally by the shareholders to each other 
or to the corporation. What this means is that investors often have the freedom to vote for 
governance or business decisions that will primarily benefit themselves, even if at the expense 
of the corporation, other shareholders, and stakeholders. While duties of loyalty and care have 
traditionally only applied to officers and directors, courts have occasionally applied loyalty 
duties on majority shareholders on behalf of the minority holders.38 The duty prohibits 
controlling shareholders from exercising their controlling influence in such a way to extract 
private gains for themselves that are in detriment to the minority’s interests, but this 
application of duties on shareholders is rare. The limit is almost only applied in two 
circumstances: freeze-out mergers and close corporations.39  In order to be a “controlling” 
shareholder, the investor generally needs to hold more than 50% of shares40 and specifically, 
needs to exercise actual control over the corporation.  
Perhaps one reason courts are generally reluctant to import duties onto investors 
because historically shareholders were believed to have little influence on corporate 
governance.41 If shareholders were unable to have real say or effect on the corporation, there 
was no need to impose limits on their actions. In the United States, the focus of corporate 
governance has primarily been on the relationship between the board and the shareholders, 
and rarely on the relationship between shareholders.42  Another possible reason is that there 
remains an entrenched belief that minority shareholders who are concerned enough about 
corporate value to wage an intervention or proxy contest for change, are ultimately attempting 
to benefit the corporation and all shareholders.43 While certainly not homogenous, the 
interests of non-controlling shareholders are assumedly similar and perhaps, minority 
                                                            
37 Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, JOURNAL OF 
CORPORATION LAW, Vol. 31, 662 (2006) [hereinafter “Fisch”].  
38 In re John Q. Hammon Hotels, 2009 WL 3165613 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009) (clarifying that minority 
shareholders should have procedural protections especially considering the controlling shareholder and the 
minority shareholders were competing for the same consideration).  
39 Iman Anabtawi & Lynn A. Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 Stan. L. Rev, 1255, 1271-
1272 (2008) [hereinafter “Anabtawi”]. 
40 The exception being if the shareholder holds a large enough voting block that they can influence the board 
without soliciting help from other shareholders. The block is significant enough to create change by itself and 
independent of additional support. 
41 Anabtawi, supra note 39, at 1267-1268.  
42 This is in startling contrast with Germany’s corporate governance which recognizes the conflicts that would 
likely arise between shareholders and imposes fiduciary duties on them.  
43 Id.; see also J.A.C. Hetherington, The Minority's Duty of Loyalty in Close Corporations, 1972 
DUKE L.J. 921, 934 (arguing that in US corporate law, the courts have rarely imposed obligations on minority 
shareholders, except for the vote and when the vote is exercised, it is assumed to be “exercised by a person 
interested in promoting the corporation’s welfare and the value of the investment represented by the stock.”).  
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shareholders willing to engage with the board, primarily do it to increase value that all 
shareholders can share in. Of course, this belief rests on the assumption that shareholder 
interests are “similar if not identical”44 so even if the shareholders are acting in their own self-
interest, their actions for the most part would correspond with the interests of the other 
minority shareholders as well. Holding these assumptions true, there would reasonably be no 
need for fiduciary duties and limits on most shareholders. Although this may have been true 
historically, today the rise of activist investors has critically changed the nature of the intra-
shareholder relationship and the question whether non-controlling shareholders should have a 
duty of loyalty to the corporation, their fellow shareholders, and stakeholders will be explored 
in depth later on.  
Despite the corporation being composed of many constituencies with different, 
perhaps even conflicting, interests, these same fiduciary protections and governance 
protections are not granted to any other stakeholders45, who are only protected through 
contract. While contract law may offer a degree of protection, it is apparent that the interests 
of stakeholders are of lesser priority than shareholders and they lack access to a similar level 
of insurance, despite their having considerable stake in the corporation’s future. Because 
stakeholders typically do not have governance rights in the U.S.46, they are least able to voice 
their concerns and affect change in the corporation. Stakeholders have the ability to demand 
changes through contractual modifications and can exit without significant burden47 but their 
level of investment in the company is likely to depend on their subjective perspective of the 
corporation’s future trajectory.48 A company highly motivated by maximizing profits and 
engages in more risky business strategy to generate high returns at the expense of capital 
management, which may be appealing to shareholders, would likely be less palatable to 
customers interested in a steady flow of inputs or for unsecured creditors. Both the board and 
shareholders are able to make voting decisions that can effectively short-change their 
stakeholders to no legal detriment to themselves.  
                                                            
44 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 405 (1983). 
45 Creditors may be allowed to bring derivative suits when a corporation is clearly insolvent or near the zone of 
insolvency, but the duties creditors may be able to enforce are not special duties, they are duties the directors 
owe the corporation. No fiduciary duties are owed to creditors of a solvent company.  
46 There are exceptions to this rule: employees who are given equity stocks or labor unions that own substantial 
stakes in the company.   
47 Fisch, supra note 37, at 666.  
48 K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Hedge Fund Activism and Long-Term Firm Value, 8 (Nov. 19, 2015) available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693231 [hereinafter “Cremers”]. 
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Given the often divergent interests between stakeholders and shareholders, one 
interesting case study is that of the stakeholder acting as shareholder: the union shareholder. 
Employees cannot generally have a significant voice in corporate affairs, but certain unions 
who have large stakes in their companies are able to demand changes. What is most 
interesting about this constituency when they exercise control, because they have the 
influence of shareholders but a rationally different set of objectives, is that they choose to 
further worker interests rather than pursue profit maximization.  One notable example is the 
United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) union protest of Safeway in 2003 and the 
subsequent refusal of CalPERS, a major Safeway investor, to endorse the reelections of 
directors and launch of a proxy contest. The President of CalPERS, Sean Harrigan, who was 
also acting executive director of the UFCW union, was criticized for using his influence as a 
significant investor to advance union goals. Harrigan led a union rally against Safeway and 
demanded the CEO’s resignation in light of the company’s failure to fairly negotiate with 
their employees. The institutional activism demonstrated here was criticized as being too 
focused on labor interests rather than the creation of shareholder value. That this criticism is 
levied is indicative of how strong a hold shareholder primacy has in corporate governance49; 
shareholder value is taken as a good while social utility is deemed secondary. This is not 
unique to the United States, but it is worth noting that corporate social responsibility is 
emphasized greatly in other Western industrialized nations as typified by the mandatory 
representation of stakeholder interests on their boards. Like shareholders, stakeholders have 
their own objectives, and when given a chance, choose to advocate for their own interests. 
Thus, when greater control is given to stakeholders, the corporation is more likely to advance 
goals external to pure profit maximization.  
b) Shareholder primacy: Should shareholder value be equated to entity value? 
 
The evolution of shareholder primacy, which has fundamentally changed the face of 
corporate governance, can be traced to the well-publicized and argued theory of shareholders 
being the ultimate owners of the corporate entity.50 This theory that corporations exist to 
                                                            
49 Although the criticism stemmed from Harrigan’s use of his position at CalPERS to influence the labor 
negotiations, it is foreseeable that if Harrigan’s goal was return maximization for the corporation, the criticism 
would have been less severe.  
50 See generally Fisch, supra note 37; Lynn Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy: Signs of Its Fall, and the 
Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), Cornell Law Faculty Publications, Paper 865 (2013).  
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maximize share or market value51 has been the driver of the move towards greater shareholder 
governance rights, which further protects shareholder interests, and this in turn has enabled 
shareholders to demand and acquire even greater shareholder wealth. Using shareholder value 
as an approximation for a corporation’s health or success essentially sanctions the notion that 
shareholder value is equivalent to corporate value.52 Given that shareholder value is so 
dominantly used as both an assessment tool and the ultimate corporate objective to attain, it 
becomes necessary to ask if this treatment of shareholder value as equivalent to entity value is 
a mistake and if it is, which value should boards aim to promote?  
The difficulty of defining “value” should not be understated. Corporate law experts 
continuously attempt to define it, but there’s no settled definition that is satisfactory to all 
sides. The very delineation between shareholder value and entity value is a controversial 
topic. Perhaps a good starting point is to examine the objectives of the shareholder base and 
the corporation. Shareholders rationally have one goal in mind, personal or institutional return 
maximization, whereas the goal of any corporation should be long-term survival, if not 
success. While these goals are certainly not incompatible, high earnings for shareholders do 
not require the ultimate survival of a given corporation they’re investing in.53 It is 
understandable then that shareholders, who value high returns, place heavy emphasis on share 
price and profitability, but then a corporation, whose survival is dependent on much more 
complex factors than today’s market value, should also use a measurement of value more 
complex than share price. Entity value should incorporate additional metrics: sustainability, 
risk, corporate practices, social responsibility, productivity, employee and customer 
satisfaction, reputation, etc. Share price cannot and does not reflect all of these other 
variables, which contribute significantly to the long-run health of the corporation.54 Entity 
value, as opposed to share value, implies the improvement of the welfare of the company, not 
inconsistent with the interests of stakeholders or shareholders. But when managers and 
directors primarily pursue increases in share price, they make the affirmative choice to 
emphasize shareholder interests above the corporation’s as a whole. Fiduciary duties to the 
corporation is distinct from the duty to the shareholder and by creating this veil between 
                                                            
51 The modern evocation of a shareholder primacy theory has led both academics and corporate agents to use 
share price as the foremost metric of a corporation. It is important to note that the use of Tobin’s Q, share price 
or net profits all amount to the same thing: they are all measures of shareholder value.  
52 Fisch, supra note 46, at 639 (arguing that while “shareholder wealth may be an appropriate proxy for a broader 
conception of firm value“ actual empirical studies do not demonstrate such “reliance on shareholder wealth“). 
53 This is not to suggest investors hope for the financial ruin of the firms they invest in, but only that the goals 
are distinct and at times, can become divergent.  
54 Fisch supra note 46, at 673-674.  
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management and shareholders, it essentially allows the officers to make effective decisions to 
benefit the corporation without heedlessly succumbing to pressure by investors.  At best, 
share price is an inaccurate and overly simplistic measure of entity value,55 but at worst using 
it to measure success can lead boards to make decisions that destroy the long-term value of 
the corporation.56  
Shareholders today receive substantial deference in this country: fiduciary duty 
protections, strong governance rights, and a significant amount of academic literature and 
judicial opinions that advocate for shareholder primacy and share value maximization above 
stakeholder or “enlightened” value maximization.57  Because shareholders are now able to 
significantly influence corporations, the worry is that the other parties who have a long-term 
stake in the company may be neglected to the detriment of the corporation’s health and social 
utility. Corporate governance has reached a point in time when shareholder primacy may no 
longer be a satisfactory answer and this next section will question whether today’s emphasis 
on shareholder value as the foremost metric of corporate value is still compelling. 
V. How have the changes in ownership affected corporate governance and performance?  
 
a. Are board interests now too closely aligned with shareholders? 
The original Berle-Means agency problem stemmed from the uneven distribution of 
authority between dispersed shareholders and a board strongly controlled by management. 
The worry was that the shareholders’ best interests would not be represented by their 
fiduciaries. As the interests of directors were not properly aligned with their investors, they 
would fail in their monitoring duties and management would be able to exercise substantial, 
unchecked control. In attempts to resolve this agency concern, Berle and Means advocated 
corporations adopt more shareholder-friendly policies.58 The modern influx of a large 
institutional investor base and the implementation of substantive shareholder rights resulted in 
a paradigm shift: shareholders are no longer passive or voiceless and now have the ability to 
impact governance decisions. Institutional shareholders additionally possess institutional 
influence and although the literature is mixed, there does seem to be a prevalence for 
                                                            
55 Id., at 673.  
56 Id.; see also William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 
(2002). 
57 Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, Business 
Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Apr. 2002).   
58 Berle, supra note 1.  
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institutional shareholders to vote in alignment with each other. Consequently, institutional 
investors, especially when acting in concert, have real swaying power over the board. Over 
the last two decades, institutional holders have pushed management to be more responsive to 
the more immediate pressures of capital markets and to the electorate’s requests.59 
Shareholders now have the power of the proxy vote, and have used their influence to elect 
independent directors, direct executive compensation, de-stagger boards, and generally 
implement more shareholder friendly business strategies, such as more frequent distribution 
of dividends. Shareholders in the earlier part of the century likely also had demands, but the 
difference is, that when institutional investors make demands today, they are more likely to be 
met.60 One of the more significant and tangible consequences of institutional ownership is that 
corporations are more sensitive than ever to shareholder wishes. While Berle and Means 
perhaps might see this move towards shareholder compliance as a positive, there are 
substantial risks to today’s evolved agency problem. The rise of unchecked shareholder rights 
has created novel concerns surrounding board myopia.61 
This brings the limited commitment problem to focus—due to informational 
inefficiencies, today’s shareholders are rationally inclined to side with business and 
governance decisions that result in value creation they can foresee occurring during their 
holding period.62 Investing in longer-term strategies, while perhaps significantly more 
beneficial to the corporate entity and other stakeholders, is often out of their purview. These 
shareholders would thus want to protect their interests by influencing the board to likewise 
adopt likewise more short-term inclined policies.63 The limited commitment problem, which 
accounts for more complexities than the theory of “short-termism” does not deny that there 
are institutional investors interested in longer-term investments, but emphasizes that it is 
difficult for most shareholders to credibly value longer-term investment strategies and 
governance policies.  If it is taken as true that institutional shareholders typically focus on 
quarterly earnings and on share price rather than on longer-term metrics because of their 
incentives structure, then it is reasonable that they would not generally have objectives aimed 
at improving long-term corporate performance simply because they will likely no longer be 
                                                            
59 Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be 
Managed for the Long Term Unless their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term? THE BUSINESS 
LAWYER Vol. 66, 16 (Nov. 2010) [hereinafter “Strine”].  
60 Id.  
61 K.J. Martijn Cremers et al. Hedge Fund Activism and Long-Term Firm Value, 8 (Nov. 19, 2015) available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693231 [hereinafter “Cremers”]. 
62 Id. at 22.  
63 Id. at 23; Strine, supra note 57. 
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investors of the corporation once those policies take effect. If their own investment strategy is 
only geared towards the near-future, it would lie outside of their purview to focus corporate 
strategy on producing sustainable wealth.64  
Understandably, Delaware corporate law is very clear and adamant on this issue—
outside of a Revlon situation65, the board’s fiduciary duties are owed to the corporation and 
not to its shareholders. The law recognizes that the board should have the power, within 
limits, to pursue its vision for the future, while taking into account what is best for both the 
corporation and its shareholders.66 Contrary perhaps to activists’ opinions, the corporation is 
not made up of only shareholders for the purpose of appeasing shareholders—there are other 
important constituencies to consider: employees, trading partners, creditors, consumers, and 
society.67  However, now that activist investors have begun to launch interventions to “fix” 
corporations, the boards who are anxious to avoid public interventions or fearful of losing 
their director positions, are arguably more likely to succumb to the shareholders’ demands, 
regardless of whether enacting the changes will actually be beneficial to the corporation.68 
The contemporary concern is if shareholders now have too much influence over boards, and 
with executive compensation tied so closely to share value and corporate performance, 
whether management interests are too closely aligned with shareholders’.  The concern is that 
eventually activists will simply elect fiduciaries who only “parrot the views of institutional 
shareholders with a short-term focus.”69 Once the board and management are mere puppets of 
their shareholders, it becomes extremely probable that they will put forward policies that are 
geared less towards the corporation’s long-term survival. If a board is myopically focused on 
pleasing the stockholders, it really diminishes the advantages created by the traditional 
separation of ownership and control. The corporation’s other stakeholders and long-term 
interests would tend to be neglected and this myopia would further create a cyclical problem: 
stakeholders would be disinclined from investing with corporations that are too focused on 
                                                            
64 This theory does not take it for granted that the shareholders are apathetic to the corporation’s long-term 
survival. While some literature would characterize institutional investors, especially hedge funds, as 
unconcerned about the continued life of a corporation, it would be unreasonable to apply this investment 
philosophy to all institutional holders.  
65 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).   
66 This deference is emphasized by the frequent articulation of the business judgment rule in US corporate law. 
See e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 170 NW 668 (Mich.1919).   
67  See generally Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 NE 2d 776 (Ill. App. 1968).  
68 Yonca Ertimur, Board of Directors’ Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals, 
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, Vol. 16 (June 2009) (showing that the rate at which shareholder majority 
vote proposals were implemented by boards have increased dramatically—from 16.1% in 1997 to 40% in 
2004—and arguing the decision to implement is strongly determined by shareholder pressure).  
69 Strine supra note 32, at 12.  
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pleasing shareholders.70  This disengagement of stakeholders would be a great disadvantage to 
any corporation’s long-term firm value.  
Despite these concerns, the ability of shareholders to have voice and effectuate control 
should not be understated as a positive. The original fears that shareholder interests were not 
taken into account by management and firm resources would be used inefficiently and 
contrary to shareholders’ desires, has substantially subsided today. Institutional holders made 
substantial pushes for shareholder rights and though the causation relationship cannot be fully 
determined here, their influence on the shareholder rights movement should not be denied. 
The caution should be on how substantial of an influence institutional investors can have on 
governance decisions; as with most areas, there is wisdom in moderation—dangerously 
narrow alignment is likely just as, or more, detrimental than substantial misalignment.71 In 
order to preserve the separation of ownership and control, perhaps the growth of shareholder 
rights and use of shareholder value as a proxy for firm value should not proceed unmitigated.  
  
b. Do institutional holders sufficiently represent the interests of beneficiary owners? 
 
A new agency concern that has emerged along with the prevalence of institutional 
holders is the tension between these holders and their clients: the beneficial owners of the 
shares. While there are activist shareholders amongst the institutional holders, i.e. a small 
percentage of hedge funds, the vast majority of institutional investors are not activist or 
perhaps, especially proactive in their duties as shareholders. The traditional story articulates 
that it is more rational for institutional entities to divest their shares of a poorly managed 
company than to invest their efforts in implementing new value-creation policies for the 
corporation, even if said changes would be advantageous to the long-term holders.72 The 
portfolio manager’s desire to generate quick profits for his fund, at the expense of the market, 
is not similarly aligned to the long-term interests of beneficiary owners. Simply put, the 
incentive structure that governs these institutions should not encourage the portfolio managers 
to consider the best interests of the record holders. It is the limited commitment problem and 
“short-termist” argument again, but it now pits the institutional intermediaries against the 
beneficial owners as opposed to the board. Intermediary holding institutions have high 
                                                            
70 Cremers, supra note 34.  
71 Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, Institutional Investors: Power and Responsibility, SEC (Apr. 19, 2013) 
(acknowledging the great influence and ability to effectuate control institutional holders have and simultaneously 
recommending that these holders exercise caution in using this power).  
72 Gilson, supra note 11.  
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turnover rates for their equity investments, and in obvious aspects should be considered 
“traders” rather than “owners” of their investments.73  As in any agency relationship, 
institutional holders owe fiduciary duties to vote their shares on behalf of the beneficial 
owners’ interests74, or at the very least, not in conflict with their interests.75  
The beneficial owners of these shares are generally ordinary people, who would likely 
not meet the minimum wealth requirements to invest with hedge funds. These are individuals 
who are typically using their investments primarily to increase their savings to fund retirement 
or their children’s college education.76 As these goals are more long-term, they would tend to 
also need their investments to be sustainable in the long-run. According to Chief Justice Strine 
and Gilson, this is directly contrary to how the typical mutual fund or pension fund operates. 
They appear to have short-term investment strategies, and tend to assess quarterly earnings 
and use stock prices as indications of value.77 Institutional turnover rates have become 
increasingly high and different studies posit that mutual funds will not hold the same or 
similar shares in a portfolio by the next year.78 When institutional investors participate in 
corporate governance decisions and vote, they tend to focus on issues such as executive 
compensation, takeover defenses, and shareholder rights. While these issues may reflect the 
institutions’ interests, they likely do not reflect the interests of the beneficiary owners’.79 
These end-user investors would reasonably care about the ultimate sustainability of their 
wealth, not quick profits in this year and upheaval in the next. Institutional investors are more 
concerned with shareholder rights than if their portfolio corporations invest too little in future 
growth and R&D, if they’re too highly leveraged, or if the business strategies are risky. But 
these issues are of necessary consequence to the end-users—protecting the long-term 
                                                            
73 Edith Hotchkiss & Deon Strickland, Does Shareholder Composition Affect Stock Returns? At 2.  
74 Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982) (articulating the 
fiduciary duties owed to ERISA beneficiaries). 
75 Kohn, supra note 10.  
76 Strine, supra note 57. 
77 Even though share price is volatile and myopic as a measurement of value, it is the dominant instrument used 
by institutional investors. Maximizing shareholder value through the stock price is criticized as being short-
sighted and actually reducing genuine corporate value. See e.g., Steve Denning, The Seven Deadly Sins of 
Activist Hedge Funds, Forbes (Feb. 15, 2015) http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2015/02/15/the-seven-
deadly-sins-of-activist-hedge-funds/#77b83f074447.   
78 According to Morningstar, the most active mutual funds had portfolio turnover rates that ranged from 215% to 
972% and averaged out around 320%. These percentages would equate to holding periods of 24 weeks, 5 weeks, 
and 16 weeks. DOW PUBLISHING COMPANY, MUTUAL FUND EFFICIENCY AND PERFORMANCE (2007) available at: 
http://www.dows.com/Publications/Mutual_Fund_Efficiency.pdf; see also Simon C. Wong, Why Stewardship Is 
Proving Elusive for Institutional Investors, BUTTERWORTHS JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND 
FINANCIAL LAW, 406 (July/August 2010).  
79 This theory reflects the assumption that beneficial owners would actually engage in governance and have a 
long-term trajectory, which seem reasonable but are certainly has not been demonstrated irrefutably by empirical 
evidence.  
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prospects of firms is the only way to ensure market stability so their investments are still 
viable in the future.  
  Because the record holders have a longer-term trajectory in front of them than their 
investment intermediaries, critics have argued that these intermediary institutions need to 
consider and genuinely align themselves with protecting those interests for long-term 
corporate gain.80 It is especially dangerous given that institutional holders are able to affect 
control and change at the levels they do. The corporations they influence would thereby also 
be positioned to advance the institutional views on corporate growth and governance, rather 
than views held by the beneficiary owners. This separation of ownership from owners here 
necessarily creates a schism in control and ownership. When the institutional investors and 
the true owners of corporations have divergent ambitions, it is up to the fiduciary to match 
their actions to the beneficiary’s goals, so there is no stark conflict in interests.  
 This argument, however thorough, does not seem to present a complete picture—
despite having shorter holding periods than in the past, institutional investors do hold onto the 
same investments for years. Many popular mutual funds have extremely low turnover rates—
Vanguard 500 Index Fund (VFINX), which has total net assets of $396.8 billion, has a 
turnover rate of 3.4%.81 Although mutual funds and pension funds may be judged on their 
relative performance and tend towards short-term determinants of value, they, like the 
beneficiary owners, have equal incentive in the preservation of a strong capital market system. 
If public corporations begin to fail because of this supposed institutional preference for short-
termism, this will necessarily harm the institutions as well as the beneficiary owners. Mutual 
funds such as Fidelity and Vanguard can only thrive if their investors are satisfied and hopeful 
in the future. The crux of the conflict seems not to be that institutional holders are all naturally 
short-termist but that long-term governance interventions are not as advantageous in light of 
strong exit options.82 Perhaps it would be of greater value to the beneficiary owners for their 
intermediaries to partake in more interventions to ensure more optimal, long-term governance 
approaches.  
 The recent politicization of pension funds adds an interesting dimension to this 
intermediary agency problem:83 should portfolio managers be able to inject their subjective 
                                                            
80 See e.g., Gilson, supra note 9; Kohn, supra note 10; Strine, supra note 32.  
81 500 Index Fund Investor Shares (VFINX), Vanguard (Dec. 31, 2015) 
https://advisors.vanguard.com/VGApp/iip/site/advisor/investments/productoverview?fundId=0040. 
82 Cremers, supra note 34. 
83 Daniel Bradley, et al. The influence of political bias in state pension funds, JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL 
ECONOMICS (Jul. 28, 2015) (noting a key difference between mutual funds and pension funds is that in pension 
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views when selecting investments if 1) the primary goal of fund management is to generate 
financial returns for the beneficial owners and 2) their views differ from and are thus not 
representative of the beneficial owners’? Fund managers are expected to maximize profits for 
their beneficiary owners but when they insert additional concerns about the environment, 
social utility, or corporate responsibility, and employ these variables in their investment 
strategies, there is the risk they are diminishing returns for the sake of less quantifiable and 
more political motivations. The recent 2015 bulletin from the Obama Administration seems to 
suggest pension funds would not be breaching their fiduciary duties if they were to employ 
such a selection process,84 but it can easily be imagined that funds which primarily invest in 
socially sustainable companies may fail to create satisfactory returns for the beneficial 
owners—in such an instance, it would be seem that they have failed to adequately represent 
their clients’ interests in this agency relationship. Insiders criticize this practice and 
contemplate that “pushing politics on retirement funds will destroy returns”85 and in fact, an 
empirical study done by Daniel Bradley et al. shows that the political bias fund managers 
demonstrate has had negative consequences on fund performance.86 Furthermore, fund 
managers and beneficial owners are likely to have different opinions on these unsettled, 
sometimes controversial issues; one can easily imagine blue collar workers having contrary 
political perspectives on social and environmental issues to an MBA-educated portfolio 
manager, who may also have different views from the pension’s board of trustees. Whose 
views are the funds supposed to represent? Freely allowing fund managers to integrate their 
investment strategies with personal political inclinations is challenging and creates a host of 
new questions that are not easily answered with the current strata of case law.  
  
c. Should activists be treated as controlling shareholders? 
 
Hedge fund activism, whether perceived as value-enhancing or detrimental to the 
corporate landscape, is a fundamental component of the present ownership and control 
                                                            
funds, often the trustees, managers, or officers of pension funds are concurrently politically affiliated in some 
manner, whereas mutual funds tend to have more financial experts) [hereinafter “Bradley”].  
84 And in fact, pension fund managers may be breaching their duties if they fail to select investments based on 
these less quantifiable factors. The bulletin explicitly noted that “such issues are not merely collateral 
considerations or tiebreakers, but rather are proper components of the fiduciary’s primary analysis of the 
economic merits of competing investment choices.” 
85 Andy Kessler, Forcing Green Politics on Pension Funds, WALL ST JOURNAL (Nov. 18, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/forcing-green-politics-on-pension-funds-1447891401.  
86 Bradley, supra note 81.  
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paradigm.87 Activists publically engage with major Fortune 100 corporations and undoubtedly 
influence substantially more corporations through private interactions.88 Even though hedge 
funds rarely hold a controlling bloc of shares, their power and influence in a given corporation 
can be equivalent to that of a majority or controlling shareholder.89 So although they might in 
quantitative measurements be minority shareholders, in practice and in analysis of their 
consequence on corporate governance matters, activists are arguably more comparable to 
controlling shareholders. Their influence and ability to effectuate control did not arise in a 
vacuum, however, they are only able to exercise control despite lacking the requisite 
ownership because of their influence on other institutional shareholders.90  
As discussed above, today’s shareholders play a significant role in influencing 
corporate governance through a wide range of methods: shareholder proposals, private 
negotiations with the board, campaigns, and proxy contests for board positions. When certain 
shareholders are able to have this level of dominance in corporate governance affairs, without 
needing a majority block, this clearly raises implications on the ongoing policy debates 
surrounding the rights and duties of all shareholders. Their ability to essentially exercise 
control, without having controlling ownership, has changed the landscape of U.S. corporate 
law and begs the question if the traditional approach to the fiduciary relationship between 
shareholders is out of date. If the majority of shareholder interests are homogenous and 
aligned, then the ability of hedge funds to exercise control is not an issue. But assuming other 
shareholders, whether institutional or retail, have divergent interests91 as they most certainly 
do, then the activists’ ability to act as controlling shareholder ought to be reconsidered and 
potentially limited. By failing to acknowledge the possible fiduciary obligations of minority 
activists, corporate law is essentially allowing them to act on behalf of their own self-interests 
and extract private gains at the possible expense of the other shareholders. The heterogeneity 
of shareholder constituencies should be taken into account—even while institutional holders 
                                                            
87 Lucian Bebchuk, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, Columbia Law Rev., Vol 115.5 (June 
2015).  
88 Jason D. Schloetzer, Activist Hedge Funds, Golden Leash Special Compensation Arrangements, and Advance 
Notice Bylaws, THE CONFERENCE BOARD Director Notes DNV7N5 (Dec. 20, 2015) (noting the intense media 
coverage of activism—22,974 news articles about hedge fund activism were published in 2013 although there 
were only 200 instances of activist interventions).  
89 In terms of quantitative measure, hedge funds own an extremely insignificant amount of equity shares 
compared to other institutional investors. Ben W. Heineman, Jr. and Stephen Davis, Are Institutional Investors 
Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, The Committee for Economic Development and the Millstein 
Center at the Yale School of Management, 34 (Oct. 3, 2011). 
90 Serdar Celik and Mats Isaksson, Institutional investors and ownership engagement, OECD Journal: Financial 
Market Trends (2014). 
91 Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REv. 561, 580 (2006). 
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own approximately 70% of the largest 1000 corporations, retail investors still constitute a 
substantial subsect of all shareholders and these investors may simply have different 
investment strategies.92 If it is taken into consideration that hedge funds often has the power 
of other institutional holders behind them, then it should be sufficient to say they, as 
“minority” shareholders, have enough clout to push through their own specific, interested 
agendas,93 regardless of the impact it may have on other minority investors.  
The fundamental appeal of activists to other shareholders lies in their promise of 
solving and alleviating the existing corporate deficiencies, whether related to managerial or 
business strategy. The premise that allows activism to be so successful is rooted in the 
shareholder belief that boards have somehow failed to maximize shareholder value and 
intricately tied, is their confidence that activists would be better suited to resolving these 
issues because they are shareholders themselves. Institutional shareholders similarly value 
strong shareholder rights and when activists advocate on behalf of better governance or for 
greater shareholder value maximization, it is reasonable for other shareholders to want to join 
in. By promoting the further expansion of shareholder rights, activists can really draw in 
support—but at what cost? Occasionally, by their mere threat of proxy contests and public 
interventions, the board will acquiesce to their demands.94  Because of their ability to 
influence their fellow shareholders and challenge the board, activists introduce a novel 
problem into the ownership and control relationship. Their share ownership is rarely 
controlling, but they’re able to extract the changes and gains they desire—their capacity to 
control greatly outweighs their capital risk. Just as the moral hazard issues arose in the Berle 
and Means generation with directors and management, history repeats itself and the same 
issues are reborn in a new form. Activists can similarly use mechanisms for control to their 
advantage, engage in self-dealing and can obtain private gains at the expense of other 
shareholders or the corporate entity. The courts need to address this and perhaps import 
fiduciary duties of loyalty onto activist minority shareholders before their influence can 
                                                            
92 When Carl Icahn initially gained control of a small percentage of Motorola’s stock, his hedge fund 
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become too deleterious towards other shareholders and stakeholders. The current climate of 
corporate governance is gearing towards a stakeholder revolution,95 which would not be 
sustainable under an activist “shareholder primacy at the expense of the corporate entity and 
stakeholders” heritage.  
 
V. Conclusion  
 
The original reasons why there was a necessary separation of ownership and control 
still exist today—it clearly enables efficiency, both in terms of business decision making but 
also investment within capital markets. It assumedly allows the corporation to focus on more 
than pure profitability and given today’s heavy emphasis on social responsibility, this is an 
imperative advantage. Managerial moral hazard and concerns about board entrenchment, 
contemporary problems of the Berle-Means era, continue to hound legal scholars today, but to 
a much lesser extent, mainly due to the evolution of shareholder rights.  Even staunch anti-
activist advocates can acknowledge this growth as a substantial and necessary addition to U.S. 
corporate law. But it is significant to also look beyond the rose-colored veneer and see that 
certain consequences of this structural change, i.e. the rise of activism and board myopia, has 
had dangerous implications on corporate governance. The effect of shareholders having more 
influence and voice as a result of the past century’s ownership structural changes cannot be 
said to be only positive. The worry is not so much that shareholders propose ineffective 
operational or managerial strategies and can lower long-term corporate value, but that 
everyone buys into the belief that the “indiscriminate expansion of shareholder rights”96 is the 
optimal solution to the shareholder-board agency concerns. This in turns facilitates uncurbed 
activism and creates a host of new problems not easily constrained under this new paradigm. 
It remains to be seen how the separation of ownership and control can be answered without 
creating further liabilities for the corporate entity, other stakeholders, and even the board and 
shareholders themselves. Perhaps if shareholder primacy continues to rise unchecked by their 
legal experts or corporate insiders, creating substantial costs along the way, regulators and the 
courts will eventually need to step in. Presently, it seems there is still time for private ordering 
to resolve this problem without regulatory intervention. 
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As ownership structure has evolved significantly in the past fifty years, so too must the 
nation’s corporate governance standards.  The legal recommendations and solutions that were 
appropriate decades ago are no longer relevant. This difficult question of control and 
ownership really comes down to structuring the correct incentives. Despite the evolution of 
corporate governance in America and the great strides U.S. corporations have made with 
regards to shareholder rights, there remains no clear answer on how to reconcile this 
relationship and construct the right incentives so the interests of shareholders, management, 
and stakeholders can merge. It begs the question: to what extent is this an American problem 
or a universal story? Perhaps by examining this issue in the context of another corporate law 
jurisdiction, with different values, history, and players, it will enable the US to see what a 
sustainable governance solution would look like.  
 
C. German Section 
This part of paper is concerned with the structure of the German economy between 1950 and 
2016 and its development. For the second half of the 20th century, the German economy was 
dominated by an enormous nexus of cross-interlocking of investments and a trust-like group of 
decision-makers. This specific kind of organized capitalism is what scholars called 
“Deutschland AG (Aktiengesellschaft - Germany Inc.)” to emphasize the close cooperation 
between different corporations in different economic sectors that let the German economy 
appear like one giantess corporation.97 To understand this nexus of close cooperation, this paper 
will firstly examine the history and the system that resulted in the foundation of “Deutschland 
AG”. Secondly the changes of the economic circumstances and the legal system in Germany 
during the 1990s will be described before thirdly, the situation today will be presented. The last 
part will summarize the paper. 
I. Development of German corporate ownership 
The German economy, after its disastrous breakdown at the end of World War II, grew in the 
relatively peaceful decades and a period of an ongoing European integration to be today’s fourth 
strongest economy in the world.98 The German economy herein appears to be characterized by 
strong continuity, as many companies (or their predecessors) listed in the Deutscher Aktien 
Index (DAX; German Stock Index) were founded during the 19th century. Among them are well 
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known, worldwide operating companies like Siemens (1847), Bayer (1863), BASF (1865), 
Continental (1871), Linde (1879), Daimler (1890), Thyssen/Krupp (1867 Thyssen/1811 
Krupp), as well as Commerzbank (1870), Deutsche Bank (1870) and Allianz (1890). With the 
oldest still existing corporation, Merck which’s history can be traced back to the year 1668,99 
that brings the average age of the DAX-listed companies up to 128 years.100 Throughout those 
companies’ existence, however, the economic circumstances worldwide have changed. A more 
and more globalized world and the ongoing digital revolution changed the way in which 
business is done. Besides the changes in corporate ownership, the late 1990s have had a mayor 
impact. Accompanied by significant changes in the German legislation, German companies 
experienced a still ongoing internationalization of ownership, while especially German private 
investors seem to avoid investment in shares. The history and development of what used to be 
the economic construct of “Deutschland AG”, the economic and legislative forces that 
catalyzed its end as well as the corporate ownership structures in the year 2016 will be the issues 
dealt with on the following pages. 
1. Organized capitalism – principles of “Deutschland AG” 
After the end of World War II and the “end” of the Allied control over Germany in 1949, the 
German economy experienced a time of enormous economic growth today known as the 
“Wirtschaftswunder” (“economic miracle”). Germany’s industry, especially the coal, steel and 
electricity, was caught in a time of reconstruction and reorganization and in need of financial 
support. The consequence is what some call a continuity of the economic structure of the 
German Empire or the Republic of Weimar101 and the beginning of “Deutschland AG”. 
a. Banks, companies and politics – founding fathers of “Deutschland AG”? 
The foundation of the success of “Deutschland AG” is – in contrast to the Anglo-American 
liberal capitalism – a form of organized capitalism102. Unlike the liberal capitalism, organized 
capitalism is organized by one or more driving forces. Two examples of this form of capitalism 
are the French state driven and the German “Rhinish capitalism”103. While the French system 
is based on the regulative power of the central government,104 the Rhinish capitalism is 
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characterized by a strong cooperation between companies (accompanied by the trade unions), 
the financial sector and politics.105  
The general idea behind the concept of “Deutschland AG” has been a system of cooperation 
and control in opposition to a solely market driven one. Within said system, the financial sector 
provides financial support for German companies while the capital markets did not play an 
important role.106 In a supporting function, legislative and executive powers in Germany 
provided an assisting legal framework.  
The system of close cooperation between those three actors resulted in a common benefit for 
all three: German financial institutions like Deutsche Bank, but also Commerzbank and – back 
in the days – Dresdener Bank as well as Allianz grew and joined the ranks of world’s biggest 
financial institutes with a large scale of industrial shares and consequently influence. 
Additionally, the German tax legislation provided several benefits with regards to institutional 
investments that will be discussed in the second part of this paper. 
Companies benefitted from their “Hausbank”, meaning that there are a mere one or two 
financial institutions providing the financial support for any activity without the need of 
acquiring money from the financial markets.107 Additionally, the “Hausbank” has a substantive 
inside in the company’s business which speeds up the process. The trade unions supported the 
system of “Deutschland AG” as its stakeholder approach supported them in claiming their slice 
of the pie. 
The government provided a legal framework that supported the institutional system of 
“Deutschland AG”. Certain tax reliefs have been implemented as well as rules for corporate 
governance such as voting caps, multiple-voting shares or proxy voting.108 By supporting the 
system, the government benefitted from a certain stabilization of the national economy. As a 
result, the government prevented dramatic changes in the German ecomony and could be 
assured of a cooperative work of the leading German corporations which guaranteed a lower 
unemployment rate and a stable tax income. Although the benefits for the government were less 
substantive than for companies or banks, a well developing and financed economy is an 
essential interest for political leaders. 
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b. Cross-ownership and the “Festung Deutschland” 
One main aspect, which formed the core of the German system, has been cross-participation. 
In 1996, 60 of the 100 biggest companies in Germany were involved in a system of cross-
shareholding.109 Unlike other systems of cross-participation, the German economy did not 
consist of several different groups that were isolated from each other, but of one gigantic group. 
The center of this nexus was formed by financial institutions, mainly Deutsche Bank and 
Allianz as well as Münchner Rück and Dresdener Bank.110 At its peak, this nexus of cross-
participation contained more than 168 different connections between Germany’s 100 biggest 
companies.111 But financial institutions did not just base their influence on their own assets, 
since 1870 they used shares owned by their costumers to exercise their clients’ voting rights 
(proxy voting).112 These additional voting rights provided the acting financial institutions with 
a substantive power in the general meeting of shareholders. 
Besides the investments from the core (financial institutions) to the edge (industrial companies 
among others), an outstanding feature of “Deutschland AG” has been the strong connection 
between the financial institutions in the German financial sector. Over decades, Deutsche Bank 
and Müchner Rück held shares of Allianz, while Allianz held shares of Deutsche Bank and 
Münchner Rück.113  
The term “Festung Deutschland” (Fort Germany) described the way by which German 
companies, as well as the German market, has been described by foreign investors.114 The 
codified regime for corporate groups (“Konzernrecht”) and the cooperation as explained above, 
made it almost impossible for foreign investors to gain control over German companies. A 
striking example for the way in which “Deutschland AG” defended its members is the attempt 
of the Italian tire manufacturer Pirelli to acquire the German automotive manufacturing 
company Continental. In the early 1990s, the fifth biggest tire manufacturer Pirelli attempted a 
hostile takeover of world’s number four, Continental.115 Although there was a certain 
appreciation for Pirelli’s move in the beginning, in the end a consortium – including several 
financial and industrial companies – under the leadership of Deutsche Bank and in alliance with 
the worker’s representatives and the State of Lower Saxony’s government fought a three year 
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battle to protect Continental. Finally, Pirelli had to end its ambitions and sold its shares to the 
consortium.116 
Although an institutional investment in Continental was not in the (financial) best interest of 
the companies aligning to end Pirelli’s hostile takeover, but this concept was based on a balance 
of interests and the protection of the closed German economic system, instead of high dividend. 
The involved institutions only had a strategic and less of a financial interest.117 
2. Turning points – the erosion of “Deutschland AG” 
While dealing with the reasons for the development of and its end, the question always accrues 
whether market related or legislative changes have been the major force that drove forward the 
erosion of “Deutschland AG”. The following part of the paper will show, that not one but both 
aspects came to a cumulative effect that catalyzed the end of “Deutschland AG” 
a. Market related changes 
The last decade of the 20th century marked the transition to a new era. The end of the cold war, 
the German reunification and the early beginning of what is called the fourth industrial 
revolution118 sped up the ongoing globalization. The breakdown of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) presented capitalism as superior to the form of communism the USSR 
represented. 
The new opportunities of international investments and the growing financial market worldwide 
led to a dissent about the orientation of German financial institutions. While many established 
bank managers in the boards of Deutsche Bank or Allianz retired, a new generation of bank 
managers struggled to move the focus of investments from institutional investments in 
industrial companies to mergers and acquisitions.119 To compete in that field and to be 
acknowledged as a serious service provider, institutional investments in various companies are 
counter-productive. Being service provider for company A while holding a considerable 
amount of shares of company B – which company A wants to acquire – easily leads to a conflict 
of interests. Additionally, a financial institutions customer would bare the risk that information 
about the takeover plans could be passed on to the corporation it aims for. This reorientation 
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could be seen shortly after the Pirelli/Continental incident in the case of the attempt of Fried. 
Krupp AG Hoesch-Krupp to take over Thyssen AG and in the Holzmann crisis. 
aa. Thyssen/Krupp 
In 1997, Deutsche Bank, among others, supported the Fried. Krupp AG Hoesch-Krupp (five 
years after Krupp AG succeeded in taking over Hoesch AG in one of the first hostile takeovers 
in Germany) in their attempt to take over Thyssen AG. While Klaus Breuer from Deutsche 
Bank explained their efforts as “Inverstmentbanking am Hochreck” (“investmentbanking at the 
high bar”), the workers representatives fought against the takeover and the state government 
finally prohibited the takeover.120 In the end, Thyssen AG and Fried. Krupp AG Hoesch-Krupp 
negotiated a fusion of both companies that took place November 1997. 
bb. The Holzmann crisis 
In 1999, Philipp Holzmann AG hoped to restructure its enormous debts. Unlike before, the 
banks decided that an investment would not be in their best interest. Again politics, led by 
former chancellor Gerhard Schröder, stepped in accusing the financial sector to favor their own 
financial benefit instead of the wellbeing of employees and the overall interest of the German 
economy. Because of the threat to their reputation and the massive public pressure, several 
financial institutions helped financing the lately futile attempt of reconstruction. 
 
As it can be seen in both cases, the financial institutions more and more dissociated themselves 
from the principles of “Deutschland AG”. While in 1992 the impulse to protect Continental 
came from the financial institutions, the growing importance of the capital markets and the 
reorientation of the financial sector led to a point, where a joint action in the interest of the 
stakeholders and German society could only be forced by a massive threat of the political 
powers and the syndicates. With one of the three main actors of the system “Deutschland AG” 
breaking away, the attempt of saving Philipp Holzmann AG can be seen as the last (forced) 
defense of the “Festung Deutschland”.121 
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b. Changes in German legislation 
The following paragraph will focus on legal regulations that supported the system of 
“Deutschland AG”. Within that analysis, changes in the German legislation made before the 
end of World War II will not be considered.  
aa. German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz – AktG) 122 and the “Lex Abs” 
One of the first attempts of the German legislator has been the limitation of mandates in 
supervisory boards. The huge voting power of financial institutions (as described above) gave 
them the opportunity to elect their own representatives into several supervisory boards. 
Although it is not unusual for institutional investors to be represented in supervisory boards, 
the network of cross-ownership in the German economic system resulted in a relatively small 
group having a lot of influence in the leading German companies. A striking example for this 
concentration of power has been Hermann Josef Abs, former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
of Deutsche Bank. Besides his personal influence on the former German chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer, Hermann Josef Abs has been elected into 24 different supervisory boards at the same 
time, serving as president or vice-president in 22 cases.123 Without judging his capacities, the 
enormous concentration of power, considering that the companies were among the Germanys 
biggest, led to a trust like position for Hermann Josef Abs and his colleagues. To limit the 
influence of the few and to ensure the quality of the work of members of supervisory boards, 
the German legislator in 1965 codified in § 100 para. 2 sent. 1 n° 1 AtkG124 that the maximum 
amount of mandates in supervisory boards is limited to ten. This did not break the influence of 
the financial sector on the German industry, but it extended the number of involved board 
members and helped ensure the functionality of supervisory boards. 
bb. German Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz – WpHG) 125 
The WpHG in §§ 21 ff. regulates the voting right disclosure obligation for shareholders. Since 
the Transparency Directive Implementation Act126, this obligation refers to shareholders who 
own more than 3 per cent of the voting rights in a corporation. They also need to inform the 
national supervisory authority whenever they reach 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 50 or 75 per cent of 
the voting rights. Although shares have always been and should still be an opportunity to 
invest anonymously (therefore the French stock corporation is still called “société anonyme 
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(SE)”), other investors, as well as the government and the society, have an interest in knowing 
the block shareholders, as they have a huge influence on corporations that may be essential 
for the national economy.127 
cc. German Corporation Tax Act (Körperschaftssteuergesetz – KStG)128 
The German tax law supported the cross-participation in the German economy for several 
decades. Investors benefitted from very low standards concerning disclosure obligations of 
blocks of shares they held and the fact that dividend payouts coming from shareholding blocks 
higher than 25 per cent were tax free.129 Once a block over 25 per cent was owned, corporations 
hesitated to sell them even if there were not very profitable. The main reason for this was the 
tax of such investments of over 25 per cent.130 This changed when the German government 
reorganized the Corporation Tax Act in 2002.131 The new § 8b para. 2 KStG declared that profits 
made from sale of shares will not be considered in taxation. This gave financial institutions the 
opportunity to sell the blocks of shares and reduced the amount of blocks of shares held in 
German corporations.  
dd. Newly implemented institutions 
In the progress of reorganizing the German economy, several institutions have been installed to 
exercise oversight of the German economy: the government commission “German corporate 
governance codex” and the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority). 
aaa. Government Commission “German Corporate Governance Codex (GCGC)” 
The government commission “German Corporate Governance Codex”, consisting of 
government representatives, workers, employers and scientists, was founded in August 2001 to 
implement the GCGC.132 Although the character of the GCGC is non-binding, the advice given 
are very well taken by the German corporations.133 The legislative projects that were 
recommended by the commission and have been undertaken by the government will be 
discussed in the paragraph for the respective law. 
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bbb. Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht – BaFin) 
The BaFin, founded by the Act Establishing the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority 
(Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz, FinDAG)134 in 2002, combines the three former German 
oversight authorities for insurances, securities trade and credit system under one 
administration.135 Today, the BaFin is part of the European System of Financial Supervision 
ESFS (Europäisches Finanzaufsichtsystem). 
ee. Company Control and Transparency Act (Kontroll – und Tranzparenzgesetz 
KonTraG) 
The KonTraG136 in 1998 is one of the most important changes is the history of German Stock 
Corporation Law. It has been intended to implement good corporate governance to modernize 
German stock corporations and to attract new (foreign) investors. The main points for this paper 
are a new regulation concerning proxy-voting rights, the prohibition of any limitations to voting 
rights for shareholders and the prohibition of shares with multiple voting rights. 
aaa. Proxy voting rights 
Proxy voting rights play an important role to guarantee a sufficient amount of voting shares 
being represented at the annual shareholders’ meeting. Especially today, where shareholders 
are spread throughout the globe, it is often difficult for shareholders to attend the meeting. 
Furthermore, the proxy voting rights give shareholders the opportunity to stay anonymous if 
preferred.137  
The first use of proxy voting rights is dates back into 1870, when banks used the shares in their 
depos without informing the original shareholder.138 After the prohibition of such measures in 
1884, financial institutions implemented their right to use the voting right in their general terms 
and conditions.139 Since 1937, the proxy given to the bank has already been limited to a 
maximum duration of 15 months.140 The KonTraG added a prohibition to exercise voting rights 
in the case where the financial institution owns (directly or indirectly) 5% of the corporation 
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and obligation, to inform their customer about alternative ways of representation at the 
shareholders’ meeting.141  
bbb. The prohibition of limitations to voting rights 
Voting rights are codified in § 134 AktG. Before the implementation of KonTraG, corporations 
had the option to set a certain limit to a shareholders voting rights no matter how many shares 
he owns. This limitation of voting rights has been one of the core instruments in the system of 
“Deutschland AG” to ensure the status quo in German corporations and to defend them from 
“foreign infiltration”.142 Under that regime, a hostile takeover is nearly impossible and (foreign) 
investors have no chance to expend their influence and control on the corporation. To promote 
the German economy and to attract new investors, the limitation of voting rights has been 
prohibited for listed corporations. Because of the strong position of family run businesses, non-
listed corporations are excluded from that restriction.143 
ccc. Shares with multiple voting rights 
The rightfulness of shares with multiple voting rights has been discussed since the early 
1920s.144 The shareholder benefits from a higher voting power irrespective of his financial 
investment.145  
The emission of new shares with multiple voting rights has been forbidden by law in 1937 
except for shares that were emitted with ministerial approval in the case of a “societal 
interest”.146 The amendment of 1965, although highly discussed, approved this regulation, 
despite the fact, that the ministerial approval had to be based on a “predominant economical 
issue”.147 The dispute about shares with multiple voting rights remained, until the German 
legislator with the KonTraG finally prohibited them.148 The remaining shares lost their multiple 
voting rights after a five year transitional period in 2003, if they were not approved by the 
shareholders’ meeting, what never happened.149 
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ff. German Public Transparency and Disclosure Act (Transparenz – und 
Publizitätsgesetz, TransPubG) 150 
The TransPubG was the second major change in the German legal system with regards to 
corporate governance. It is mainly based on the work of the government commission “German 
Corporate Governance Codex.151 The TransPubG improved the information rights of the 
supervisory board. The changed § 90 para. 1 AktG states that the management board is obliged 
to comment on changes to plans presented to the supervisory board in the past. This right to be 
informed has been implemented to guarantee a certain level of knowledge and understanding 
for all members of the supervisory board, so that they can effectively supervise the management 
board’s work.152 
The core provision implemented by TransPubG, however, is the obligation for corporations to 
state each year which recommendations in the GCGC they follow and in the case where they 
do not, explain why (§ 161 AktG). As the recommendations of the GCGC are non-binding, the 
principle of “comply or explain” is used set corporations under a certain pressure. Since these 
reports need to be published (§ 285 n° 16 and § 325 para. 1 sent. 1 Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB, 
Comercial Code)153) the shareholders (and the general public) are able to read and question the 
boards decisions. 
3. “Deutschland AG” and the 21st century 
With the beginning of the 21st century, the structure of German corporate ownership changed. 
The erosion of “Deutschland AG” and the economic and legal changes discussed above paved 
the way for a growing influence of foreign investors in Germany. The following part will 
analyze the growing influence of foreign investors in the DAX (1), the position of family run 
businesses in Germany’s economy (2) and the situation of German private investors (3). 
a. Foreign investors and the DAX 
Analyzing the ownership structures in Germany, it can be seen that the “Festung Deutschland” 
has fallen. The DAX154 has never been more international. At the end of 2014, 59 per cent of 
the traded shares were hold by investors residing in a foreign country; compared to 45 per cent 
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in 2005155 and 35.5 per cent in 2001.156 Within that group, European investors represent the 
biggest group with 27 per cent, followed by investors from North America with 21 per cent.157 
When it comes to corporate ownership, the situation concerning foreign investors differs 
significantly for the different corporations listed in the DAX. In ten corporations (Deutsche 
Börse, Linde, Infineon, Lanxess, Bayer, Merck, Adidas, Allianz, Daimler and Münchener 
Rück) foreign investors held more than one third of the tradable shares.158. The number of 
corporations with a German investor’s majority has decreased to nine (Fresenius SE, Deutsche 
Telekom, Deutsche Bank, Fresenius Medical Care, Volkswagen, Continental, Lufthansa, BMW 
and Henkel).159 
But not just has the origin of investors in the DAX changed. While the era of “Deutschland 
AG” was dominated by strategic investments and the principle of controlling, leading and 
organizing the German economy, the amount of strategic shareholding blocks in DAX 
corporations has declined. In 2001, the average percentage of the biggest shareholder block was 
28.89 per cent (31.10 per cent only considering the 18 corporations that still are DAX-listed).160 
In 13 years, that average has declined to 17.91 per cent (respectively 15.47 per cent).161 Still, 
there are three corporations in which the biggest block-shareholder controls more than 50 per 
cent of the corporation (Merck, Baiersdorf, Volkswagen) and another six with more than 25 per 
cent (BMW, Continental, Deutsche Telekom, Fresenius Medical Care, Fresenius SE, Henkel). 
Referring to the important role of financial institution like Deutsche Bank or Allianz, it is 
interesting to see that among today’s block-shareholders there is almost no financial institution. 
Only in two cases (Deutsche Post and Deutsche Telekom), the major block-shareholder is the 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), a state-owned bank founded in 1948 to finance the 
restructuration of Germany (§ 2 Gesetz über die Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, 
KredAnstWiAG)162.163 This shareholding, however, only exists due to the fact that Deutsche 
Post and Deutsche Telekom have been state owned companies themselves before being 
privatized. 
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b. The strong position of family companies 
Family owned companies have always been very important for the world’s economy and they 
still are. According to the Global Family Business Index, published by the University of St. 
Gallen, the 500 largest family owned businesses generate 6.5 trillion United States Dollar 
(USD), employ 21 million people and have an average sales volume of 13 billion USD.164 
Germany ranks second as country of origin with 87 registered family owned businesses among 
the largest 500.165 According to a definition given by the European Commission (EC), a listed 
company is a family owned business if the person who established or acquired the firm (share 
capital) or their families or descendants possess 25 per cent of the decision-making rights 
mandated by their share capital.166 Following this definition, Baiersdorf, BMW, Continental, 
Fresenius Medical Care, Fresenius, Henkel, and Volkswagen are family businesses listed in the 
DAX. In general, in 12 DAX-listed corporations, the founding families or other family owned 
corporations represent the biggest block-holder.167 In the field of strategic long term 
investments – which equals approximately 20 per cent of the investments in the DAX – families 
represent 52 per cent of those investments168. 
c. German private investors  
With only 8.4 million Germans (13.1%) owning shares, Germans still have a certain aversion 
concerning investments in the stock exchange market.169 Although Germans knows about the 
profit ratio of shares (29 %)170 and do see shares as long term investment (36 %)171, they are 
also of the opinion that investments in shares are risky (44 %)172 and that they require a profound 
knowledge 74 %)173. The study also differentiates between the answers given by shareholders 
and non-shareholder and non-surprisingly, the attitude of shareholders towards shares is, but 
only a bit, more positive than of non-shareholders. The question arises why Germans hesitate 
to invest in the German stock-listed corporations although their performance worldwide is 
stable. One reason, surely, is the more conservative way of German investments that is part of 
the German mentality174 and their lack of experience concerning investments in the stock 
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exchange markets, as mentioned in the study. One significant factor surely still is the experience 
of German private investors with the shares of “Deutsche Telekom AG”. In 1996, one year after 
its privatization, “Deutsche Telekom AG” shares were traded at the German stock exchange in 
Frankfurt. The emission has been accompanied by an enormous campaign presenting the shares 
as “Volksaktie”, a share dedicated to the German people instead of institutional shareholders 
(as happened in previous privatizations like Volkswagen).175 The success of the campaign 
triggered a boom in the capital markets and many Germans invested in the former state owned 
corporation as it has been presented as being sound and solid.176 In three different emission 
phases, the price for the “T-Aktie” (T-share; Telekom share) rose and peaked in the year 2000 
at 103,50 Euro per share, before it fell enormously.177 After many investors lost a lot of money 
and several investigations, the “T-Aktie” and its rise and fall are still in the collective 
consciousness of many Germans and symbolize their view on how the capital market works. 
II. Conclusion 
To conclude all the aspects presented so far, one can surely say that, especially in the early days 
of the reconstruction of the German economy, the idea of “Deutschland AG” and the principles 
of an organized capitalism helped rebuild and strengthen the Germany economy. 
A positive view on “Deutschland AG” would highlight, that the stakeholder approach helped 
ensure a constant economic growth for a social benefit. The nexus of cross-ownership and the 
thereby resulting overseen and guided marked competition helped many German corporations 
to compete internationally and survive, even in times of economic crisis like the 1970s energy 
crisis. As the financial institutions coordinated the corporations’ policies as parts of the 
supervisory boards, a centralized government-made corporate governance has not been 
necessary, because the control and supervision has been guaranteed by the “management board 
of Deutschland AG”. 
From a more negative point of view, one could argue that the main actors of “Deutschland AG” 
restored the oligarchic reign of an elite like in the system they grew up with, the monarchial 
and strictly hierarchic economic system of the German empire. While the allied forces under 
the lead of the United States tried to break the rule of monopolist corporations like the IG-
Farben, the founding fathers of “Deutschland AG” rethought this rule in slightly changed 
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conditions. Instead of physically recreating corporations like IG-Farben, they created that nexus 
that provided them with enough control of key corporations to lastly control almost the entire 
German economy. An ironic aspect of that restoration of hegemonic rule has been the 
institutional center of that reign. Like the IG-Farben, whose former headquarters are located in 
Frankfurt and are now part of Goethe University, the new heart of the oligarchic rule used to be 
the financial district in Frankfurt. 
In the end, as often, the truth lies somewhere between both ultimate positions. Surely critics of 
the “Festung Deutschland” were right, the protective German system hindered the development 
of free and liberal financial marked. Surely, the German stock market did not play an important 
role till the end of the 20th century and surely the nexus of cross-participations helped covering 
the boards’ work and led to a nontransparent system where a few important managers like 
Hermann Josef Abs, Berthold Beitz or . But one ought not to forget the disastrous situation of 
the German economy after WWII, when this nexus helped protect the economy and ensured the 
balance between the interests of corporations, financial institutions and the trade unions. In the 
end the question how the German economy would have evolved without the protective 
measures of “Deutschland AG” cannot be answered. Since the German economy was not capital 
marked focused before the war, a transition from one system to the other would have almost 
certainly been more problematic than the transition step by step, as happened from 1998 on. 
Thinking about what has to come in the upcoming years, the numbers presented concerning the 
participation of residents in the German stock market is alarming. The survey of the DAI shows 
that the lack of interest in investments mainly results in a lack of knowledge and experience. 
Keeping in mind the precarious situation of the social security – especially the pension scheme 
– the government should take educational measures to raise the activity of citizens. Not only 
are long-term investments an important aspect in securing a certain wealth for the pensions, the 
conservative investments in savings, bank books or bonds with their low interest rates, are not 
adequate to compete with the inflation. Without knowing, monetary assets are wiped out and 
the Germans miss the opportunity to participate in “their” economy’s success. 
 
To conclude, the changes made have definitely been necessary to materialize the European 
Single Market. Obviously a closed economy that concentrates on defending the status quo 
against foreign – including European – investors is incompatible with the idea of a progressing 
European integration progress. Therefore, the changes of the last two decades do not only 
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guarantee a successful transition into a more capital marked focused economy but have also 
been important for the European Union. Nevertheless it remains of the utmost importance to 
keep in mind the core principles of the German social market economy system. Key aspects, 
such as a certain focus on stakeholder values and the strong position of German trade unions, 
should be guarded to guarantee social stability. Therefore, the ongoing evolution of the German 
economy should not be ending in an assimilation with the Anglo-American system, but a newly 
defined path that combines the best characteristics of both systems. 
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D. Comparative Part 
I. Introduction  
In the combined section of the paper, the present state of corporate ownership and 
control for each country will be shortly summarized and compared. In an attempt to 
demonstrate the typical structure of share ownership in both countries, two exemplary, model 
corporations will be compared. The authors selected General Motors and Volkswagen as two 
analogous automobile manufacturers to analyze and discuss.  
II. Current Scope/Status quo 
1. US ownership structure 
Unlike many other Western and Latin American countries, public companies in the 
U.S. typically do not have a single controlling shareholder or small group of shareholders 
with corresponding voting control and equity holdings.178 Similarly unique to the U.S. is the 
lack of government ownership of public corporations. While the government has sole-
ownership of a number of corporations in the U.S.,179 it is extremely rare for a corproation to 
have both private and government ownership of its equity holdings.180 In the few instances the 
government did obtain equity ownership of a company, notably after the recession, they were 
reluctant to do so and promised to sell their stakes as quickly as possible.181 Americans have a 
strong aversion to government ownership of private industry and there is criticism levied at 
both the government and the corporate entity when ownership is in state hands.  
Despite the slow growth period following the recession, American citizens and financial 
funds mostly remain faithful to the capital market system. According to Gallup’s annual 
Economy and Finance survey conducted in April 2015, about 55 percent of Americans are 
invested in stock market either in the form of individual stocks, stock mutual funds, or a 
retirement fund. 182 Stock ownership is still at lower levels than it was before the financial crisis 
with 65 percent of national adults owning stocks in 2007.183 The largest drop was for those in 
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the lower middle class, with incomes of $30000-$74,999 from 72 percent in 2007 to 56 percent 
ownership.184  
As noted above, the trend from substantial dispersed, retail ownership in the Berle and 
Means generation has drastically shifted to concentrated institutional ownership today. In 1950, 
institutional holdings of total outstanding equity was only about 6.1 percent, by 2009 that figure 
has increased to 50.6 percent, which is actually a slight decrease after a peak of 53.3 percent in 
2005.185 The institutional ownership of the Top 1,000 US corporations—essentially the most 
efficiently traded stocks—is even more substantial at 73 percent, with institutional ownership 
peaking at 76.3 percent for the Top 251-500 US companies.186 Towards the end of 2014, the 
top fifty largest institutions decreased their equity investments by about $100 billion, only 
equating to about a 0.9 percent decline overall due to the tremendous size of these investors.187 
Because 80 percent of total institutional ownership is in domestic corporations,188 most of the 
sales in 2014 were also likely of US shares. The aggregate concentration of foreign institutional 
ownership should not be understated—most Western nations, including Japan, have ownership 
of US equity in at least comparable numbers to their ownership of their own domestic shares, 
if not more.189 In fact, the total holdings of Germany’s largest institutions constitute a 29.22 
percent ownership of German corporations and a 35.54 percent of American corporations.190  
The U.S. institutions owning the most equity are pension funds (20.7%) and open-end 
mutual funds (20.4%).191 Given that these institutions are the primary intermediaries for 
beneficiaries of 401Ks and other retirement funds, their quantitative dominance and prevalence 
in the equity markets is understandable. What is interesting about these figures is how 
numerically insignificant hedge fund ownership; of the 6,000 hedge funds, the ten largest have 
about $280 billion under management.192  Compared to the approximate $1.2 trillion controlled 
separately by the ten largest mutual funds and the ten largest pension funds,193 the amount of 
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hedge fund ownership seems inconsequential, which makes their often-times successful 
activism all the more remarkable.  
2. German ownership structure 
The German economy today is dominated by institutional shareholders. 65 per cent of 
all shareholders belong to that group. The institutional shareholders are followed by strategic 
investors (20 per cent) and private individual investors (13 per cent). The remaining 2 per cent 
remain to brokers or banks.194 
More than half of all strategic investors (52 per cent) are families or foundations. The 
German state still holds 18 per cent of those long term investments – mainly in former state 
owned corporations like Volkswagen, Deutsche Telekom and Deutsche Post – while foreign 
state funks follow with 9 per cent. 
Generally, foreign investors extended their activities in the German economy, especially 
in the DAX. AS mentioned, at the end of 2014, 59 per cent of the traded DAX-shares were hold 
by investors residing in a foreign country; compared to 45 per cent in 2005195 and 35.5 per cent 
in 2001.196 The top investor in the DAX is the Norwegian state fund Norges Bank Investment 
Management, followed by Blackrock. Deutsche Asset & Wealth Management Investment 
GmbH is the first German investor and ranked seventh. 
Although international investors successfully entered the former closed system of the 
German economy, the characteristic of dominating block shareholder is still existing. From a 
social but also economical point of view, the number of only 8.4 million Germans (13.1%) 
owning shares, seems to mark a negative characteristic for the German capital market system. 
The number even declined in from 2013 to 2014 by 2 per cent. Besides their financial loss 
because of the inequality of interest rates and the inflation, their potential to contribute to the 
German financial market remains unused. 
With 87 registered family businesses among the largest 500 worldwide, Germany ranks second 
and continues the successful story of German family businesses that not just play a minor part 
in Germany’s economy but an active and prominent role even in the DAX.197 This influence is 
even stronger in the other German indices. 
                                                            
194 DIRK, p. 7. 
195 EY, p. 6. 
196 BpB 25.09.2010. 
197 Family Business Index. 
 
46 
 
3. Comparative analysis 
The global investor profile showed that retail investors globally are generally risk-averse 
with almost half (45%) of investors preferring low risk/low return assets.198 This has generally 
translated to a short-term investing approach. 46% of investors prefer outcomes within 1-2 years 
and only about 12% preferring longer approaches with payout within 15-20 years.199 There 
seems to be some disconnect between all retail investors’ expected return and their attitude to 
risk/investment time horizon. About 42% of North American investors prefer low-risk/low 
return assets, Europe is even higher at 48.6%.200 The same post-recessionary risk-aversion 
seems to apply to institutional investors as well. As their portfolios clearly indicate, institutional 
holders in the world’s largest economies all have placed significant faith in the United States 
equity markets.201 Generally considered a safe bet, the US offers to both domestic and global 
investors, at least in appearance if nothing more, confidence in the market. As indicated by the 
limited number of retail investors in Germany and the substantial investment in US corporations 
by German institutions, investor confidence generally is significantly lower than in the US.  
Over the past few decades, Germany and the US have both seen the mammoth rise of 
institutionalism. While certain ownership concerns are unique to Germany—significant 
ownership by families and the state, general retail aversion to investment—both nations share 
in a newly developed concentration of ownership that raises questions of control. The same 
arguments advocating institutional ownership cite better monitoring of management, overall 
improved corporate performance, and greater shareholder ability to demand value 
maximization. This theory of institutionalism fails to present a complete picture of the classical 
problem of corporate governance—a unique set of agency costs presented by a separation of 
ownership and control necessarily arises here. In Germany, the large share blocks held by a few 
shareholders, notably family controlled companies, create a worry about minority shareholders 
that is less obviously relevant in the US picture of ownership.202 Compared to the US, the 
regulatory environment creates generally a lower cost of holding larger control blocks. In an 
effort to protect minority shareholders and other stakeholders, the German system imposes a 
duty of loyalty on each shareholder towards the corporate entity, stakeholders, and other 
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shareholders, but is especially applicable to dominant shareholders. 203  One specific application 
of this general philosophy that the company should serve the interests of all stakeholders is 
demonstrated by the use of two-tiered boards.204 Germany has mechanisms in place to protect 
minority and stakeholder interest that would not be diminished by the presence of a controlling 
shareholder. This “equal treatment” of all shareholder and stakeholder interests is less 
observable in the US, but this can primarily be a consequence of the insubstantial number of 
controlling shareholders in the equity markets. Since various state and federal regulatory 
burdens make obtaining and holding controlling blocks more costly in comparison205, there has 
not really been a tradition of having controlling shareholders in the US nor the consequent equal 
treatment doctrine to protect against them. In light of concerns about hedge fund activism and 
the considerable influence they are able to exercise, despite not having controlling blocks, 
perhaps it is also time for the US to adopt a similar philosophy in which the “controlling” 
shareholders are pushed to act with equal concern for the corporate entity, other shareholders, 
and stakeholders. 
II. Comparison exemplary corporations 
1. Volkswagen AG 
Based on the idea to build a car affordable for everyone, the engineer Ferdinand Porsche 
in 1934 created a prototype. To manufacture this car, the Nazi-government ordered the 
construction of Europe’s biggest car factory. After World War II, the British military command 
took control over Volkswagen (back then renamed Wolfsburg Motor Works) and in 1949, the 
military command assigned it to the newly formed state of Lower Saxony under the condition, 
that they would co-exercise the control with the German federal government and that the trade 
unions would have a significant role. In 1960, the federal government decided to privatize 
Volkswagen. The state of Lower Saxony and the federal government each kept 20 per cent of 
Volkswagen AG while 60 per cent were sold. The government intended to sell the shares as 
free float to the German people, so that the shares lay with a huge amount of individual 
investors.206 In 1988, the federal government sold its last shares and only the state of Lower 
Saxony remains as governmental representation.  
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Today, the ownership of Volkswagen AG is strongly dominated by two families: 
Porsche and Piëch. The Porsche Holding SE, owned by the successors of Ferdinand Porsche 
holds 50.73 per cent of the voting rights of Volkswagen AG.207 The second biggest block 
investors is the state of Lower Saxony (20 per cent) followed by Qatar Holding LLC with 17 
per cent. The remaining 12.27 per cent do not belong to any block holder and remain in free 
float. 
The control mechanisms concerning corporate governance in Volkswagen AG are 
very unique. As a former public company, the law privatizing Volkswagen (Gesetzes über die 
Überführung der Anteilsrechte an der Volkswagenwerk Gesellschaft mit beschränkter 
Haftung in private Hand, VWGmbHÜG)208 stated several provisions to protect the 
corporation from hostile takeovers and to maintain the governmental control:  
Firstly, § 2 VWGmbHÜG limits the voting rights for all investors to one-fifth. As the 
German state held and the state of Lower Saxony still holds 20 per cent of the voting rights, 
no investor can obtain more voting power than the state officials. This limitation is even more 
important considering the special rules for the shareholders’ meeting. Decisions of the 
shareholders’ meeting that would normally need a two-third majority need a four-fifth 
majority, leading to a blocking minority for the state.  
Furthermore, § 4 para. 1 VWGmbHÜG regulates the special right for Germany and 
Lower Saxony concerning the right to elect representatives to the supervisory board as 
Germany and Lower Saxony are, as long as they hold any shares, allowed to send two 
members for the supervisory board, each without approval of the shareholders’ meeting.  
This provision is even more important in combination with the laws regulating the co-
determination in German corporations. According to § 7 para. 1 n° 3 MitbestG 
(Mitbestimmungsgesetz, Co-Determination Act)209, the supervisory board in corporations 
with more than 20000 employees consists of ten representatives of the investors and ten of the 
workers. Keeping in mind that the government representatives belong to the investors, the 
shareholders (excluding the government) can only send eight representatives (six if the federal 
government would hold any shares) of twenty.  
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A last protective regulations is stated in § 4 para. 2 VWGmbHÜG. Decisions 
concerning new facilities or their relocation need to be passed by the supervisory board with a 
two-third majority. With twenty members, the two-thirds majority is reached if 14 members 
vote in favor. While this majority is easily reached by the ten workers’ representatives and the 
state officials, the “ordinary” board members need to negotiate. 
 
2. General Motors 
The American equivalent of Volkswagen chosen for purposes of comparison is General 
Motors (“GM”), one of America’s largest automobile manufacturers. Founded in 1908 by 
William C. Durant,210 GM has a long tradition of corporate governance issues, making it an 
exemplary choice for discussion as it serves to showcase many of the ownership and control 
concerns discussed throughout this paper.  
Today, almost 75% of GM is owned by institutional shareholders.211 Out of about 1.5 
billion shares, approximately 1.15 billion are institutional shares.212 Vanguard Group and Harris 
Associates, both institutional holders, together alone own over 10% of all outstanding shares.213  
But its largest shareholder is actually the United Automobile Workers of America (“the 
UAW”), through a retirement medical trust which owns about 8.7% of GM shares.214 Given 
that labor traditionally does not receive any special consideration in the US, the union’s large 
stake in GM certainly add a unique dimension to the auto manufacturer’s ownership and control 
story. But its influence dates back to several decades. In 1936, GM suffered a three-month strike 
by its workers protesting poor working conditions and was only resolved by negotiation with 
the UAW.215 The Union continues to serve as an important bargaining agent for most American 
autoworkers, and because of its influence, it has steadily advanced the interests of labor in a 
giant public corporation, which is atypical to many American public corporations where the 
focus is primarily on shareholder interests. Given the UAW’s ownership interest today, this 
stakeholder has considerable equity leverage and is able to use its influence as a shareholder to 
benefits its labor interests. 
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In recent years, the corporation has undergone significant ownership transition 
beginning with the federal bailout of General Motors in spring of 2009 after the company faced 
bankruptcy after suffering a disastrous loss of $69.6 billion in 2007-2008.216 To salvage both 
the company and an estimated million jobs, the government loaned GM $5.5 billion and 
invested another $49.5 billion in the corporation, which equated to a 61% equity stake.217 From 
2009 to 2013, when the government sold its ownership stake, a taskforce appointed by the 
government oversaw the company’s activities. In the aftermath of the investment, the 
government lost about $11.2 billion of their total investment218, and GM itself suffered 
significant reputational damage from having a government overseer.219 Being labeled 
“Government Motors,” is a stigma the company would not easily recover from.220 However, 
proponents of state intervention argue that this picture is incomplete and that the governing task 
force actually helped to significantly relieve the dire situation at GM.221 The company turned 
profits in 2010, and in 2011, its profits were among the highest ever at $7.6 billion.222 During 
the Obama Administration’s investment period, GM made a series of wise operational 
decisions—it spun off the less profitable Saab and Saturn brands, consolidated operations and 
its supply-chain, and began to invest in more energy-efficient cars.223 But perhaps it was less 
fiscal concerns and more of the puppeteer strings that were attached to the arrangement that 
frustrated management; given the typically wide discretion granted boards, public corporations 
do not have to be concerned with stringent mandates set by their shareholders. However, this 
deal was conditioned on GM being placed under certain limitations, including a cap on 
executive compensation.224 Top management claimed that this control mechanism has severely 
limited the company from recruiting the best executives and consequently losing talent to better 
improve the company and generate value. Though considering that their pre-bailout CEO, Rick 
Wagoner, was extremely well paid and rather aptly helped bring the company to the brink of 
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bankruptcy, perhaps GM’s priorities should not be focused on bringing back higher executive 
pay.  
Shortly after the company completely privatized, GM was plagued by an instance of 
aggressive shareholder activism in which a group of institutional investors demanded a stock 
buyback of $8 billion and a seat on the board for Harry Wilson, a former member of the Obama 
Administration Auto Industry Task Force appointed to oversee GM.225 The four hedge funds 
backing Wilson were Appaloosa Management, Taconic Capital Advisors, Hayman Capital 
Management, and HG Vora Capital management, who together controlled approximately 2.1 
percent of GM stock.226 While it is certainly not unusual for activists to launch proxy contests 
to elect their own directors, this particular instance of activism was unusual because it was 
Wilson himself who went to the institutions and offered his ideas in exchange for compensation 
packages with each fund. Unlike more prominent activist investors, Wilson did not have a 
substantial stake in the company himself, owning only about 30,000 shares personally, nor was 
he the head of a major hedge fund. Instead, in a rather entrepreneurial approach to activism, he 
went out and sought hedge funds to support his ideas—including the $8 billion buyback 
program and electing himself to a board position.227 He made a deal with each of the four hedge 
funds for different levels of compensation if he was successfully elected to serve on the board. 
For example, his commission with Appaloosa was set at 2% of the upturn on their GM shares, 
and with Taconic Capital, it was set at 4%. Among other concerns about poor incentives, the 
golden leashes likely encouraged him to avoid compromise with the company so he could 
personally profit. The conflict present in any activist shareholder-nominated director is already 
inherent—the financial compensation plans and side deals certainly only serve to make these 
relationships more complicated. His contracts, representing four different leashes, with these 
hedge funds, stipulating different term lengths and demands, would have certainly undermined 
his ability to act consistently with respect to his fiduciary duties to all shareholders.  
 In March, GM acquiesced to the buyback and agreed to repurchase $5 billion worth of 
shares in exchange for Wilson and the institutional funds abandoning their plan to elect Wilson 
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to the board.228 The corporation’s desire to avoid a proxy battle was understandable—it would 
have been extremely costly and ugly for both sides. In the following months, GM purchased 
back 85 million common shares from its stockholders.229 At the outset of the GM’s 
announcement, Moody’s ratings firm was clear that the buyback would have a negative credit 
implication on GM.230 Given the numerous financial and operational difficulties still facing the 
corporation, its decision to reduce its liquidity position of $25 billion by 20% to fund the 
repurchase program was a suboptimal decision. That shareholders holding approximately 2% 
of all shares could affect such drastic change that is potentially detrimental to the corporation 
epitomizes the influence activists can have, despite not having a comparable ownership stake 
and risk. This effective separation of economic ownership from control has dangerous 
implications and these activist arrangements raise serious questions on good corporate 
governance—perhaps it is time for the either government regulators or the private sector, to 
reexamine activism and the mechanisms activists would use to exercise control. 
 
3. Comparative analysis 
The comparison between General Motors and Volkswagen stands exemplary for the 
difference in German and US corporations. Although both are not “typical” corporations as they 
have an outstanding position in the national economy, their similar position in the national but 
also worldwide economy and the involvement of the national government makes them 
interesting cases to analyze.  
General Motors and Volkswagen both are dominated by institutional shareholders. With 
88 per cent, the rate is a bit higher than for General Motors with 75 per cent. The important 
aspect while comparing both corporations is the number of institutional shareholders. As 
mentioned Vanguard Group, Harris Associates and the UAW are the biggest block shareholder. 
Together they own almost 20 per cent of the shares. In comparison with Volkswagen that is 
somewhere between the Quatar Holding and the state of Lower Saxony. The three biggest (and 
only) institutional shareholders of Volkswagen together own the 88 per cent while the biggest 
three of General Motors stay around 20 per cent. This example is also characteristic for 
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comparing the US and Germany. Although the biggest shareholder blocks in the DAX listed 
corporations lowered their investments, block-shareholding is still very important in Germany 
while in the United States blocks over 10 per cent are exceptional. 
An interesting and unexpected issue is the ownership of the UAW. Seeing the diversity 
of shareholders in the United States, their voting block of 8.7 per cent is a serious factor. The 
German trade unions on the other side do not own shares of Volkswagen, although it was 
planned from the first years after the war on that the workers of Volkswagen should have a 
strong position. Generally it is possible for German trade unions to invest in shares but it would 
not have been appreciated a few years ago. In the DAX and also concerning Volkswagen, the 
trade unions do not play an important role as investors. This might also be due to the fact that 
their influence in corporations is guaranteed by the German legal framework. 
Another interesting aspect to highlight is the governmental involvement in both 
corporations. Firstly it is important to state out is the difference in their investments’ origin. 
While the predecessor of the German state was the driving force behind Volkswagen, General 
Motors has been founded by a private entrepreneur and the US government only got involved 
because of the crisis at General Motors and the upcoming bankruptcy. Also the maximum 
influence differs. Only considering Volkswagen after it was handed over by the British military 
command, the highest amount of shares held by the state of Lower Saxony and the Federal 
Republic has been 40 per cent. After the US government stepped in during the crisis, the highest 
amount held have been 61 per cent. 
Besides the amount’s height, the use of those shares is probably the most interesting 
aspect in this analysis. The US government shortly after it acquired the shares started to re-
privatize the corporation without any intention to guard a certain amount of shares to keep any 
influence on General Motors. In Germany, only the federal government sold its shares while 
Lower Saxony guards its shares like its most valuable treasure. In 2007, the German 
government even risked a confrontation with the EC because it has seen the protective 
provisions described as violation of the European treaties. 
E. Conclusion 
The ownership structure of companies is a significant component of any discussion on 
corporate governance. Despite differences in cultural values, investor confidence in the 
market, and regulatory schemes, Germany and the US are both presented with the same 
fundamental problem: how to minimize agency costs necessarily associated with a separation 
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of ownership and control. As ownership structure changes over time, so too does the effect on 
control and ultimately, corporate performance. The two nations’ similar trajectory towards 
institutionalism may indicate a more enduring and global trend.  
In Germany, there is a general concern about the behavior of individual shareholders, 
and the courts and regulators have implemented instruments to help remedy any potential 
abuses of power. The protective measures are aimed at correcting the conflicts between 
individual shareholders and between shareholders and stakeholders. In the US, the primary 
conflict that has traditionally created anxiety is the relationship between management and 
shareholders. But the agency concerns have changed in the US as a consequence of the 
evolution of share ownership. The questions that have been relevant to Germany for years is 
now demanding notably more attention in the US than ever before. What is the proper 
function of a company and whose interests should it ultimately serve? How can minority 
interests be protected in light of an unbalanced control dynamic in the shareholder base, and 
how should those mechanisms be optimally implemented—by the state or through private 
ordering? These trends feature in most of the current discussions on corporate governance and 
despite the noticeable differences found in the comparison between these two nations, the 
fundamental concerns about ownership and control are universal and not symptomatic of one 
nation in particular.  
